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Statutory Presumptions and the Federal

Criminal Law: A Suggested Analysis
Gerald H. A brais*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The criminal laws and the institutions charged with the
administration of those laws are now the subjects of extensive study.
The federal government' and various states 2 are in the process of
revising their criminal codes. The purpose of this article is to discuss
what kind of presumptions should be enacted by a legislative body."
The term presumption has been used in several ways.4 I use the
*

Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University, School of Law, Camden,

New Jersey.
I extend my deepest and sincerest appreciation to Professor Louis B. Schwartz of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School for the aid and thoughts he offered to me on the
problems covered in this article.
I. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws is now engaged in the
monumental task of drafting a proposed criminal code for congressional consideration.
2. For example, Delaware and Pennsylvania are considering drafts of their respective
proposed criminal codes. New Jersey embarked upon code revision in the summer of 1969.
3. For general discussions bearing on this problem, see C. McCoR, ncK. EviI)ENcL 639-68
(1954); Comment. The tff!,et
of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof,68
U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tut.. L. REv. 17 (1930);
14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928):
Chamberlain, Presumptions as 'irst .Alid to the District Attorn.
Laughlin, In Support of the Tha.ver Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953);
Martin, The Burden of Proof as Affected by Statutory Presumptions of Guilt, 17 CAN. BAR
REv. 37 (1939); Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proofand Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 34 (1952); McCormick, Charges on Presumptionsand Burden of Proof.5 N.C. L. RFv.
291 (1927): Sandier, The Statutori Presumption in Federal Narcotic Cases, 57 J. CRIJI. L.C. &
P.S. 7 (1966): Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 277 (1968); Note,
Constitutionalityof Rebuttable Statutory Presuniptions,55 COLUtNI. L. REv. 527 (1955); Note,
Statutory Crintinal Presumptions: Judicial Sleight of Hand. 53 VA. L. RiV. 702 (1967):
Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory, Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. Cmti. L. Riiv. 141
(1966); Comment. Traffic Violations: Vicarious Liability of Owners and Presumptive OwnerOperation, 23 U. CI. L. RE:v. 532 (1956); Comment, Necessity of Logical lnference to Support
a Presumption, 17 S. CA.. L. REv. 48 (1943).
4. For a survey of how the word has been used see Laughlin, supra note 3. at 196-204.
For example, some have used the term in the sole sense of shifting the burden of coming forward
to the defendant that is,
to treat an issue as a matter for defense. See text accompanying notes
6-15 infra. One commentator has suggested that the word should be used only to indicate that
once sufficient evidence of the basic facts is adduced, the presumed fact is established unless the
defendant comes forward with evidence rebutting the presumption. See Laughlin, supra note 3.
at 207-09. See also Morgan, supra note 3, at 43.45. Others use the term in the same sense as I
do. See Note. Statutorr Criminal Presunptions:Judicial Sleight of Hand. 53 VA. L. Ri:v. 702
(1967) (-Reduced to functional terms, the presumption allows the fact finder to infer fact B from
the proof of fact A.").
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word (hereinafter in italics) as a collective term to embrace situations
in which a legislative body declares that proof of certain facts (the
basic fact) has an effect in establishing other facts (the presumed fact
which is the alleged crime or an element of the alleged crime).
In Part II of this article I shall consider situations in which I
believe presumptions are improperly used-that is, when they are
employed to accomplish substantive results which could be achieved
through enactment of ordinary statutes. I shall also discuss cases in
which a presumption concept is employed unnecessarily-that is, when
it is used to allocate the burden of coming forward5 to a defendant on
a particular issue when the proof allocation could be made directly
without the benefit of a "presumption."
In Part III, I shall analyze the test used to determine the
constitutionality of a presumption-the rational connection standard.
Here, I offer an interpretation of the standard that places substantial,
but fair, limits on the Congress in this area.
In Part IV, I recommend adoption of two varieties of
presumptions: a natural inference presumption and an empirical data
presumption. The former involves only the designation of the basic
facts that establish a prima facie case. An empirical data presumption
has two consequences: (1) submission of the case to the jury unless the
evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding of the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) a required instruction to the jury
of the probative value of the basic facts.
The subject of this article is the federal criminal law, and,
therefore, the discussion is concerned with congressional action.
However, I believe my conclusions apply equally to state criminal
codes.
II.

"PRESUMPTION"

IMPROPERLY USED

In the federal criminal law, the term presumption and
presumptions, as I have defined them, have been employed in several
ways that are unnecessary and improper. In one class of cases, the
5. i use the burden of coming forward to mean that unless there is evidence to raise the
issue it does not enter the case. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 635-38 (1954). See also note 8
infra. Professor Morgan prefers to use the term "risk of non-production" to indicate that it
makes no difference as to who produces the evidence. See Morgan, How to Approach Burden of
Proofand Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 34, 35 (1952).
I use the term "burden of persuasion" to indicate the extent to which the evidence must
convince the fact finder. Here, the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See
text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
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judiciary has used a presumption concept solely as a means of
allocating to a defendant the burden of coming forward and/or
persuasion on a specific issue. In other situations, the Congress has
used a presumption to achieve a substantive solution which could have
been achieved through enactment of a well-drafted statute.
The presumption of sanity is an excellent example of a
presumption that acts solely as a proof allocation device.6 In Davis v.
United States, the Court stated that "the law presumes that everyone
charged with a crime is sane" and that the issue does not enter the
case unless there is evidence "that will impair or weaken the force of
the legal presumption in favor of sanity." 7 This means simply that the
burden of coming forward with evidence tending to establish insanity
is on the accused. Such allocations can be accomplished directly
without invoking a presumption. Use of the term does not aid
analysis of the relevant factors that might justify a shift of the burden
of coming forward to the accused. Here, for example, it would be
appropriate for the Congress to treat insanity as an affirmative
defense;' if the prosecution had to disprove insanity in every criminal
case, the administration of justice would be unduly delayed since most
individuals are legally sane.9
An enigmatic use of the term presumption occurs in conspiracy
prosecutions. When defendants have raised the defense of the statute
of limitations, courts have stated that once a conspiracy is shown to
have existed it is presumed to continue until it is affirmatively
terminated or, as to a particular defendant, until he specifically
withdraws. 0 With respect to termination, it has been suggested that
the effect of the presumption of continuance is to shift the burden of
proving termination to the defendant." This is contrary to the
6. See Soules, supra note 3, at 279-80. The author suggests that presumptions that relate
solely to the allocation of proof are false presumptions and cites as an example the presumption
of sanity.
7. 160 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1895).
8. 1 use the phrase "affirmative defense" to mean that the issue does not enter the case
until it is raised by the proof, but that once it is in the case the government has the normal
burden of persuasion on the issue. Some states denote the same procedural consequences by use
25 (McKinney 1967). 1 prefer the term
of the term "defense." See N.Y. PEN. LAW
"affirmative defense" because it indicates that the matter generally is not to be considered until

it is raised affirmatively.
9. The federal courts have uniformly taken this position. E.g., Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469 (1895). See McKensie v. United States, 266 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1959).
10. United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863 (1959);
Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1956).
II. Developments in the Law-Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L,. Rav. 920, 961 (1959).
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traditional rule that requires the government to establish that the
action is timely beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Furthermore, the

concept of a presumption of continuance is unnecessary. The statute
of limitations runs from the time the crime ends; that is, when the

agreement is abandoned or its objects accomplished. When this occurs
depends essentially on an analysis of the conspiratorial agreement.' It

can be recognized factually that a conspiracy may involve a
continuous course of conduct without using a presumption concept
that may carry with it an unintended or improper procedural

consequence. 4 With respect to withdrawal prior to the end of the
agreement, the presumption of continuance may mean that the

defendant has the burden of coming forward and/or persuasion.,
Here, the presumption is not needed since the proof allocation can be
made directly.'"
The traditional example of the use of a "presumption" to
accomplish solely a substantive result is the so-called conclusive

presumption. This is merely a substantive rule of law.

For example,

12. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957); United States v.
Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965).
13. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); United States v. Borelli. 336 1.2d
376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). See generally Wesehler. Jones & Korn.
The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute:
Attempt. Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 979-91 (1961).
14. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(7)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) which provides
that a "conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes
which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the
defendant and those with whom he conspired ....
15. See. e.g., United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 960 (1965); United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979
(1952).
16. The presumption of innocence also falls into this category; it is but another way of
saying the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See C. Mc(CORIICK.
EVIDENCE 648 (1954); Soules, supra note 3, at 279. Moreover, the inference that the concept
suggests-people charged with crime are more likely to be innocent than not-does not accord
with the actual facts. See C. MCCORMICK. EviINCE 647-78 (1954). This is not to say, however,
that the presumption of innocence is unimportant. The Supreme Court has emphasized its
significance in guaranteeing a defendant a fair trial. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456
(1961). Also, the concept has been used in a variety of ways in the lower federal courts to
protect the defendant. See Armstead v. United States, 347 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (trial
court's order that prosecutor refrain from calling the accused "Mister," as other witnesses were
addressed, was held to violate the presumption); Communist Party of the United States v. United
States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964) (a burden may not be
shifted to the defendant if it unduly jeopardizes the presumption); United States v. Campbell.
316 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1963) (trial judge may not sit on a case in which his personal knowledge of
the defendant's criminal activities may jeopardize the presumption of innocence).
17. The authorities are virtually unanimous on this point. E.g., Brosman, supra note 3. at
24; Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proofand Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. Rwv. 34
(1952); Soules, supra note 3, at 278-79.
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Title 15 United States Code, section 77b provides that any security
given or delivered with, or as a bonus on account of, any purchase of
securities is conclusively presumed to constitute a part of the subject
of such purchase and to have been offered or sold for value. The
provision could be redrafted to state that any security delivered with
or on account of any purchase of a security or other thing is deemed
8
to have been offered and sold for value.1
Congress has enacted presumptions to accomplish ends that
could be more easily attained by passage of ordinary statutes. The
existing kidnapping presumption t -that interstate transportation is
rebuttably established by the failure to release a victim within 24
hours after the perpetration of the abduction-is needless. Seemingly,
the purpose of the provision is to enable the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to aid local authorities in the investigation of
kidnapping cases. The presumption could be replaced by a statute
conferring upon the F.B.I. the aforementioned power. Since there are
a number of federal interests that are likely to be affected or involved
in kidnapping cases it seems that the constitutionality of the proposed
statute could hardly be questioned; whereas the constitutionality of the
existing provision is doubtful. ° Congress has also enacted a
presumption that provides that removal of goods from an interstate
pipeline is prima facie evidence of the interstate character of the
goods.2 ' The apparent purpose of this provision is to ensure that all
robberies, even of goods moving intrastate, are within federal
investigative and prosecutorial jirisdiction. Rather than achieving this
end through enactment of a presumption, Congress could simply
make any theft from an interstate pipeline a federal crime. Such a
statute is clearly constitutional under the commerce clause 2 This
18. in short, a conclusive presumption is a way of modifying the definition of the crime.
See, e.g., Brosman supra note 3, at 18; Laughlin, supra note 3, at 198-99. So viewed, the only
constitutional problem raised by a conclusive presumption is whether the crime as it is defined
violates the due process clause. See Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:Judicial Sleight of
Hand, 53 VA. L. REV. 702, 721 n. 117 (1967). See also Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable
Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 545 (1955).

19. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1964).
20. Applying the rational connection test (see text accompanying notes 25-65 infra) it is
difficult to see the relationship between holding the victim 24 hours and interstate
transportation. One guesses that the abductors would make an interstate transportation
immediately after the crime when they go to their hideout or not at all. Of course, if an
empirical study of past kidnapping cases indicated a pattern contrary to my factual estimate,
this would be highly relevant.
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 659 (Supp. 1968).
22. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
311 (1942).
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course of action avoids the difficulty in marshalling and analyzing the
empirical evidence necessary to establish the rational connection of the
existing presumption.
III.

THE RATIONAL CONNECTION PRINCIPLE

Before discussing specific legislative proposals, it is worthwhile to
consider the major test of the constitutionality of a presumption-the
rational connection principle. In this way, the parameters of
congressional authority can be defined. The standard was adopted by
the Supreme Court in Tot v. United States. It was stated that:
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the
inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience . . . P

The Tot decision has been criticized vigorously by scholars.2 ' But, in
1965, the Court in United States v. Gainey 5 and United States v.
Romano 6 established firmly that rational connection is the main test
of a presumption's constitutionality. This conclusion was confirmed
on May 19, 1969, by the Supreme Court in Leary v. United States.7
Most commentators have been critical of the rational connection
standard. Some have argued that the term "rational connection"
represents a vague concept that fosters inconsistent results (Gainey
and Romano allegedly are inconsistent)2 Others have asserted that
the Court's exclusive concern with rational connection is misplaced
and that other factors such as the comparative ease with which proof
can be adduced should be major considerations in a due process
inquiry! 9 In part, these criticisms stem from a failure to recognize
that rational connection is a limitation on the power of the Congress
to legislate evidential effects. That is, the standard is relevant when
23. 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).
24. See Morgan, Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1324 (1943); Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34
U. CHI. L. REV. 141 (1966).
25. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
26. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
27. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
28. See Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:JudicialSleight of Hand, 53 VA. L, REv.
702, 712 (1967). See also Comment, The Constitutionalityof Statutory Criminal Presumptions,
34 U. Cm. L. REV. 141, 150-52 (1966).
29. See Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:Judicial Sleight oJ Hand. 53 VA. L. RILv.
702, 713-14 (1967); Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 535 (1955). See also Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City' R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S.
35, 43 (1910).
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Congress states that the basic facts constitute sufficient evidence or
prima facie evidence."" Different problems are presented when a
presumption has such procedural consequences as a required jury
instruction or a shift of a burden.
With respect to rational connection the cardinal, and as yet
unresolved, question is what level of probative value must a
31
presumption attain to be rational and hence constitutional. In Leary,
the Court held unconstitutional the portion of the statute that
provides that possession of marijuana is sufficient evidence of the
defendant's knowledge of the marijuana's illegal importation unless
his explanation convinces the jury to the contrary. After reviewing the
precedents, Justice Harlan, for the Court, stated that "[t]he upshot of
Tot, Gainey, and Romano is . . . that a criminal statutory
presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' . . .
unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend. ' 32 Appended to the above quotation was
a significant footnote in which the Court said that since section 176(a)
was unconstitutional under the "more likely than not" test, "we need
not reach the question [of] whether a criminal presumption which
passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal
'reasonable doubt' standard if proof of the crime charged or an
essential element thereof depends upon its use." 33 The Court's reliance
on precedent seems to be unjustified; Gainey, Tot, and Romano in no
way mention the standard adopted by the Court. Nevertheless, the
important problem is whether the "more likely than not" test
comports with reason and sound policy.
I submit that a presumption is arbitrary when Congress accords
the basic fact an evidential effect that exceeds the fact's natural
30. See Morgan, Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1324 (1943); Comment, 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1943).
31. The grand jury had returned a three count indictment against Leary. He had been
charged with smuggling marijuana into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 176(a) (1964), with the transportation of marijuana, knowing it to have been imported
illegally, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964), and with transferring the marijuana without
having paid the special tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (1964). The trial judge dismissed
the smuggling count. Leary was convicted of the other two crimes, and his conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed the tax
count conviction. It held that the privilege against self-incrimination provided Leary with a full
defense and accordingly the Court dismissed the tax count. See 395 U.S. 6 (1969). The Court's
discussion of the presumption thus related to the second count of the indictment.
32. 395 U.S. at 36.
33. Id. at 36 n.64.
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probative value. For example, if Congress said proof of fact X is
some evidence of fact Y, but in truth, fact X is irrelevant to Y, the
statute would be unconstitutional. Similarly, if Congress declares
proof of fact X establishes, prima facie, crime Y, and if the judiciary
disagrees with the conclusion, the provision would be unconstitutional.
These observations are borne out by Gainey and Romano. In the
former, the Court upheld a presumption4 which provides that
presence of a person at an illegal distilling operation is sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction for carrying on or being engaged in
the operation. Proof of the exact same basic fact-presence at the site
of an illegal still3 -was deemed constitutionally insufficient in
Romano to authorize conviction for possession, custody, or control of
an unregistered still. Presence, however, is relevant to establishing
possession, custody, or control 6 The critical distinction between the
two cases lies in the nature of the crimes involved. The Gainey Court
noted that the crime of carrying on an illegal still operation is very
broad, and encompasses anyone who aids and abets in any way 7
Therefore, Congress had accorded the fact of presence its natural,
probative force because illegal distilling operations work clandestinely,
and only employees are normally allowed on the premises3 On the
other hand, the crime alleged in Romano has been defined narrowly,
and includes only those who had custody or possession, or those who
directly facilitated custody or control-e.g., a caretaker 3 Prior to
Romano, the courts had uniformly held presence to be insufficient
evidence to authorize a conviction for possession of a still," and,
therefore, Congress acted unconstitutionally in attempting to accord
the basic fact more than its natural probative value.
My conclusions flow from the principles of procedural due
process that have been regularly applied to criminal prosecutions.
Each defendant is entitled to a fair trial with all of the fundamental
guarantees. One of these guarantees is the obligation of the
prosecution to prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
"This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free
34.
35.
36.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 5601(b)(3).
See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 5601(b)(4).
382 U.S. at 141.

37.

380 U.S. at 67.

38. Id. at 67-68.
39. 382 U.S. at 139-41.
40. In United States v. Bozza, 330 U.S. 160 (1946), it was held that presence alone was
insufficient evidence to convict for possession. Presence is relevant to possession, but tells
nothing about the accused's particular function. 382 U.S. at 141.
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society-is a requirement and safeguard of due process of
law . . . . "41 It is founded on the recognition that witnesses may and
often do err in their recollections, and on the fundamental belief that
criminal penalties are so harsh that they should not be imposed unless
the defendant's guilt is a near certainty.12 A presumption that
provides, for example, that proof of the basic fact is sufficient
evidence to authorize a conviction, but is irrational as I use the term,
allows the jury to convict on insufficient evidence. Such a provision is
unconstitutional because it conflicts with the reasonable doubt
standard, and injects caprice into the trial by directing the court to
treat something as true which might well be contrary to the actual
facts. It is also tantamount to trying a man for a crime with which he
is not charged-e.g., in Romano the defendant was tried for presence
rather than possession.
The Leary Court's interpretation of the rational connection
standard is directly contrary to my conclusions. A "more likely than
not" rule is germane to civil proceedings, but is invoked
inappropriately to measure the legality of a presumption that
authorizes the jury to find a crime or an element of that crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. The reasoning of Leary is akin to the principle
once followed in the Second Circuit 3 and in no other federal court4
that the civil test of sufficiehcy applies in criminal cases. Assumedly,
there are instances in which evidence will support a finding by a
preponderance and not beyond a reasonable doubt. In such a
situation, Leary permits a conviction. This, I believe, is indefensible;
the reasonable doubt concept rests on sound, time-tested policies and
should not be overturned. Since a footnote in the opinion indicates
that the problem remains somewhat open, the Court should take the
next opportunity to modify and limit the Leary view of rational
connection.
It is enigmatic that the Court in Leary favored the "more likely
than not" test and rejected the so-called "greater includes the lesser"
standard. Both, however, qualify for the same criticism. The "greater
41. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
42. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
43. United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956);
United States v. Castro, 228 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1956) (whether there is substantial evidence to
support the verdict).
44. See, e.g., Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837
(1947); Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788 (8th Cir. 1915).
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includes the lesser" theory has received considerable support; 5 it was
first put forth by Justice Holmes in Ferry v. Ramsay (a civil case).6
There, under a state statute, bank directors who permitted the bank
to accept deposits with knowledge of the bank's insolvency were liable
to the depositors. A statutory presumption allowed the trier of fact to
infer knowledge of insolvency from acceptance of deposits. Here, the
basic fact has little or no relevance to the presumed fact. Nevertheless,
the provision was upheld on the grounds that it was within the power
of the state to impose strict liability, and that the challenged statute
imposed only a lesser liability. 7 The Solicitor General advanced this
"greater includes the lesser" theory in support of the presumptions in
Tot,48 Romano,.9 and Leary.s° In each case, the Court replied that the
constitutionality of a presumption is tested by what Congress enacts
and not by what it may hypothetically enact. I believe the Court's
conclusions are valid. The danger of the "greater includes the lesser"
theory is that in some cases it will overturn the reasonable doubt
requirement and will permit a trial for what Congress could have
enacted rather than for what the defendant is charged 5
There are intimations in Tot, 52 Leary,53 and other cases5 that
even if a presumption is rational, it may be unconstitutional if it
imposes an undue hardship on the accused; comparative convenience
is, in theory, a subsidiary test of constitutionality. In the same vein, it
has been argued that a rational presumption should be upheld only if
the "legitimate interests of the state" outweigh the "hardship borne
by the defendant. ' 5 5 Hardship involves a situation in which the
45. Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. C11u. L.
REv. 141, 147 (1966) (the logic of the standard is unassailable). See C. McCoRNICK. EVIDENCL
662 (1954).
46. 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
47. Id. at 94.
48. 319 U.S. at 472.
49. 382 U.S. at 144.

50. 395 U.S. at 36 n.63.
51. Professor Morgan states that if a defendant is charged with the crime of transporting
a firearm, and a presumption makes possession prima facie evidence of transportation, the

provision is irrational if it permits the jury to convict for possession and not the alleged crime.
Thus, the defendant would not have had a real opportunity to defend. Morgan, Constitutional
Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1943).
52. 319 U.S. at 470.

53.

395 U.S. at 34.

54. McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Mobile, Jackson &
Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 41 (1910).
55. Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial Sleight oJ Hand, 53 VA. L. REv.
702, 735 (1967).
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defendant cannot easily rebut the evidential effect of the particular
enactment. The hardship arguments are insignificant under my
interpretation of rational connection. If a presumption is clearly
rational, I can see no reason to reach the hardship issue. In such a
circumstance, with or without codification, proof of the basic fact
justifies a certain evidential effect. Even if the evidence tending to
refute the presumed fact were not readily accessible to the accused, I
do not think that the due process clause would preclude the
government from establishing its case as it chooses.
In evaluating the rational connection test, it is important to
consider whether the courts will defer to the expertise or judgment of
the Congress. In Gainey, the Court stated that in empirical matters
"not within specialized judicial competence or completely common
place, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress
to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from
it.""S This statement was quoted with approval in Leary. However, to
date, the Court has not exercised the deference it has suggested is
appropriate.
Prior to the passage of the Gainey provision, various courts
disagreed as to whether proof of presence was sufficient to authorize a
conviction for engaging in an illegal distilling operation. Congress
enacted the presumption to resolve this disagreement. The Court in
Gainey noted that the special legislative finding that illegal distilleries
operate in secrecy "only confirms what the folklore teaches. ' '57 The
Justices apparently believed that they were as qualified to assay the
probative value of the inference as was the Congress. Moreover, a
legislative attempt to overturn uniform judicial decisions by stating
that proof of presence alone is sufficient to authorize a conviction for
possession of a still was deemed unconstitutional in the Romano
decision.58 In Gainey and Romano the reluctance of the Court to defer
to the Congress may be explained by one or a combination of the
following possibilities: (1) information concerning the operation of
illegal distilleries is completely commonplace, or (2) Congress did not
develop an adequate legislative record, and, therefore, the Court was
in the same posture as the legislature. The opinions are not clear as to
which rationale was relied upon.
In Leary the Court expressed its conception of the role of the
56.

380 U.S. at 67.

57. Id.
58. The Court emphasized that the fact of presence tells very little about the defendant's
specific function. 382 U.S. at 139-40.

1146

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

Congress in this area. Justice Harlan stated that in order "to
determine the constitutionality of the 'knowledge' inference, one must
have direct or circumstantial data regarding the beliefs of marijuana
users generally about the source of the drug they consume" and that
"such information plainly is 'not within specialized judicial
competence or is completely commonplace.' "51 The Court concluded,
however, that the legislative record was inadequate to resolve the
empirical questions raised by the constitutional challenge to the
presumption. Apparently, little attention was paid to the knowledge
inference in the House or Senate debates. Furthermore, according to
Justice Harlan, the testimony before the legislative committees was
contradictory, inconclusive, and out-of-date on the crucial question of
the source of domestically consumed marijuana. 0 Therefore, the
Court felt obliged to review various treatises and governmental reports
and found that most domestically consumed marijuana comes from
Mexico. Justice Harlan then discussed the various ways a possessor
may acquire knowledge of the source; on this issue, for the most part,,
the legislative record was silent. After considering several treatises and
the testimony of experts given in another case, the Court could not
say with substantial assurance that a majority of marijuana
possessors know the source of the drug they consume."
The conclusion must be reached that Congress should develop the
type of empirical record established by the Court in Leary. With its
vast resources Congress can hire experts to gather all pertinent
empirical data on a particular question and can hold hearings to
examine every side of an issue. Congress can do this more efficiently
than the courts, and when it is done, it is anticipated that the Court
will pay more heed to the legislative evaluation of the probative value
of a presumption. While, under my view of rational connection, the
function of the Congress is limited insofar as it can give the basic
facts no more evidential effect than they have anyway, in another
sense the function of the Congress can be quite extensive and
significant. It can efficiently gather relevant empirical data and
thereby demonstrate the probative value and rationality of
presumptions.
59. 395 U.S. at 37-38.
60. Id. at 39.
61. Id. at 52.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A.

Introduction

I begin with the premise that the evidential effect of a
presumption should be to establish a prima facie case-a case
sufficient for submission to the jury. Any lesser effect would be

tantamount merely to a declaration that the basic fact is of some
relevance to the presumed fact and is not of sufficient consequence to
warrant congressional attention. Nor is a declaration of relevance
likely to be of significant aid to the prosecution. On the other hand, it
seems clear that the Constitution prohibits passage of a presumption

with a greater evidential effect than establishing a prima facie case.
Practically speaking, the only possible greater effect is a directed
verdict for the prosecution on the strength of the evidence; this would
be contrary to due process of law.12 Given the premise that a
presumption should have only the effect of establishing a prima facie
case, I think two varieties of presumptions are necessary.
B.

Natural Inference Presumption

This device would have the sole consequence of designating
certain facts prima facie evidence of a crime or an element of a crime.
There are 28 provisions with this procedural effect in the United
States Code. I believe enactment of the natural inference presumption
would be warranted to resolve actual or potential judicial
disagreement over submission to the jury of a recurring factual
pattern. For this purpose, as the Supreme Court has suggested,6 3 it is
62. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Similarly, a presumption that has the
evidentiary effect of establishing a prima facie case with respect to an element of the crime and
has the additional procedural consequence of shifting the burden of coming forward with some
rebuttal evidence to the defendant with respect to an element of the crime is unconstitutional. It
is contrary to the reasonable doubt requirement. Moreover, if the defendant does not introduce
any evidence, the judge under this presumption would be obliged to tell the jury that if it finds
the basic fact it must find the presumed fact. Gainey indicates that it is a violation of the right
to trial by jury to instruct in terms of mandatory inferences. 380 U.S. at 70. In any event, there
are only a few precedents favoring this type of presumption. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for
the Second Circuit, interpreted the predecessor of the presumption dealing with smuggling to
shift the burden of coming forward on the issue of guilty knowledge once the defendant's
possession of the smuggled goods was shown. United States v. Minneci, 142 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.
1944). Also, at one time the Reporter of the Model Penal Code and a minority of the American
Law Institute Council argued that a presumption should have at least the same effect as an
ordinary affirmative defense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
This assumes away the significant question: that is, whether the reasons for enacting
a presumption parallel those for creating an affirmative defense.
63. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
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both reasonable and appropriate for Congress to act to aid the
prosecution. It would not be sound to legislate, however, with respect
to all evidential problems that might arise in the federal criminal law.
The division of authority between the Congress and the courts should
be preserved. Therefore, I would employ this procedural device only
where especially vigorous law enforcement is needed or where the
government has had great difficulty in obtaining compliance with the
law.
Since a natural inference presumption involves an evaluation of
inferences without the benefit of special expertise, a required
explanation to the jury of the congressional view of the evidence is
not justified. 4 The foundation of our criminal law administration is
the jury; we have confidence in the ability of laymen to find the truth,
and a qualification of our system should not be made unless it is
clearly warranted. There is no reason to substitute the judgment of
legislators for that of jurors when both are equally able to analyze the
facts.
A fine example of a situation in which Congress should enact a
natural inference presumption arises in the area of transportation of
stolen cars across state lines. 5 Numerous violations of this kind
occur, and the problem has plagued the F.B.I. for a number of
years.66 There has been judicial disagreement as to whether presence in
a car transported across state lines knowing it to be stolen is prima
facie evidence of the crime of aiding and abetting the forbidden
transportation." Resolution of the problem would aid the government,
since without the cooperation of one of the other travellers, it is
difficult for the prosecution to convict a person who is only riding in
the car.
Assuming that there are substantial law enforcement problems in
the area, another statute which properly falls into this proposed
category provides that presence in a vessel or conveyance containing a
substantial ratio of dead, crippled, diseased, or starving wild animals
64. See McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C. L. RrEV. 291,
302-10 (1927). The author suggests that if an inference is unclear to the jury then an instruction
is necessary. If the evidential connection is apparent, however, then the charge may be omitted.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964) prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles, knowing the same to be stolen.
66. In 1965, there were an estimated 486,568 motor vehicle thefts. PRESIDENT'S CONIM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRLLI
SoCIETY 18 (1967).

67. See Baker v. United States, 395 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1968), in which the court, over
Judge Blackmun's dissent, held the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction.
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or birds is prima facie evidence of importation under inhumane
conditions." Without any empirical evidence, legislation might be
appropriately enacted. Disagreement as to the probative value of
proof showing the condition of the animals might arise from the
difficulty in defining "inhumanity," and because some judges might
place undue weight on other possible causes of injury to the animals
(e.g. storms).
C.

Empirical Data Presumptions

An empirical data presumption should be enacted only when
Congress decides on the basis of empirical evidence that a recurring
factual pattern is strong evidence of crime. This procedural device
would have two consequences: (1) a jury instruction concerning the
probative value of the basic facts would be required; and (2) when there
is sufficieit 9 evidence of facts that give rise to the presumption, the case
would be submitted to the jury unless the evidence as a whole clearly
precludes a finding of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Required Jury Instruction.-The important feature of the
empirical data presumption is the required jury instruction. It is
necessary since by hypothesis the empirical evidence which is the basis
of the provision is not readily available to, or known by, the public at
large. Unless the jury receives an adequate explanation, it might
acquit when conviction is justified.
The form of the jury instruction is quite important; both the
defendant's and government's interests should be considered. Part of
the charge should be that all of the evidence must establish the
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. This points the jury to all
the proof so that the statute is not given undue weight. The court
should then state that the jury may find the presumed fact from the
basic facts alone, since the latter is strong evidence of the former.
Permitting the jury to make the finding by accepting or rejecting the
inference is consistent with existing law. Given the constitutional right
to trial by jury and the importance of maintaining the jury as an
independent, viable institution, such an approach is valid. On the
68. 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1964).
69. I would employ the word "sufficient" to encourage trial courts to analyze the
evidence in order to determine whether the proofs will support a finding of the basic fact. The
latter is essentially a finding by the preponderance of the evidence. The Model Penal Code
requires only "evidence." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Compare United States v. Gitlitz, 368 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1966) (discussing what is sufficient to
show possession within the meaning of the narcotics presumption).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

1150

[VOL. 22

other hand, use of the phrase "strong evidence" is a departure from
existing law. This seems necessary to give proper emphasis to the
provision.
There are two significant omissions in the suggested charge.
First, I would make no mention of the congressional finding, because
jurors might pay more heed to the opinion of Congress than to the
evidence of the case. 7 Second, I would not, as do many existing
statutes, state that the jury may find unless the defendant adequately
explains to the jury's satisfaction. Such language may compromise the

defendant's privilege against self-incrimination; 71 therefore, sound
practice dictates its omission.
The constitutionality of this type of required jury instruction was
challenged for the first time in Gainey. Justice Black argued, in
dissent, that Congress may not tell the juries what constitutes
sufficient evidence to convict because such a direction constitutes an
impermissible abridgment of the right to a jury trial secured by the
sixth amendment.72 This argument was rejected by a majority of the
Court. 73 It emphasized that the jury was told only that it may convict,
and that, in the absence of a statute, such an instruction is
permissible 4 Thus, in substance, the Court was suggesting that the
sixth amendment does not preclude comment on evidence and that
this type of legislative directive is tantamount to a proper instruction.
I agree with this conclusion, and it would seem that as long as the
provision is phrased in terms of a permissible inference it will be
upheld. Nor, in my opinion, can the power of the Congress to pass
such a provision be questioned. Given its power to enact procedural
rules for the courts, and its power to define crimes, there is ample
congressional authority to require that juries receive an explanation of
the probative value of an empirical data presumption. As a practical
matter, I do not foresee that this question will be raised frequently. If
70.

In Gainey. the Court suggested that it was the better practice to omit any explicit

reference to the statute in the charge. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71 n.7 (1965).
71. In Gainey, the trial judge in one portion of the charge used the phrase "unless the
defendant by the evidence in the case and by proven facts and circumstances explains such
presence to the satisfaction of the jury." The Court held that this could not have been
understood to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The Court did, however, infer

that any "allusion" or "innuendo" based on the defendant's decision not to take the stand is
illegal. Id. at 70-71. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
72. 380 U.S. at 77-78.
73. The trial judge did deliver the instruction in Gainey. It, therefore, may be argued that
the Court did not pass on the question of whether Congress can require such an instruction.
Nevertheless, the Court did stress the propriety of the lower court's action.
74. 380 U.S. at 70.
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a provision rests on evidence that is not apparent to or readily known
by jurors, most trial courts will instruct the jury about the probative
value of the basic facts.75
2. Submission of Case to Jury.-If there is sufficient evidence
of the facts giving rise to the empirical data presumption, I would
require the court to submit the case to the jury unless the evidence as
a whole clearly precludes a finding of the presumed fact beyond a
reasonable doubt. The purpose of this standard of sufficiency, as
distinguished from deeming certain facts only prima facie evidence, is
to ensure that the courts take full account of the special legislative
finding reflected by the empirical data presumption. It also provides
guidance for the occasional case in which a judgment of acquittal is
justified. The Model Penal Code makes a similar recommendation
with respect to its presumption; it uses the standard of "unless . . .
the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact." 76 I prefer
to include the reasonable doubt concept in the standard because this
77
relates the question to the ultimate burden of persuasion.
It was argued in Gainey that Congress may not require
submission of a case to the jury. Such a provision, it was asserted,
interferes with the constitutional guarantee which gives the trial judge
control over a criminal trial. 7 This contention was avoided by the
Court's strained construction of the statutory language "shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." According to the
Court, the provision did not illegally invade the trial court's discretion
because it neither required the submission of the case nor precluded a
directed verdict. 79 In my opinion, it was unnecessary for the Court to
take this approach. As I have suggested, Congress has the power to
define crimes and to enact procedural rules for the federal courts. It
does not seem to be an unreasonable extension of its power for
Congress to declare that certain proof requires the submission of a
case to the jury."
75. f"the trial courts refuse to so charge, the government does not have an effective
remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3741 (1964).
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
77. The standard of "clearly negatives," in my opinion, is too vague.
78. 380 U.S. at 76-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 68-69.
80. See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV.
195, 205 (1953) (a legislature having the power to define crimes would have the power to
prescribe the proof necessary to get to the jury); Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 277, 295 (1968) (Congress is qualified on the basis of expertise to make

assessments that neither court nor jury can make); Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:
Judicial Sleight of Hand. 53 VA. L. REV. 702, 715 (1967) (Congress may tell judge and jury

what is sufficient to convict).
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D. Advantages of the Empirical Data Presumption
The empirical data presumption should be enacted when
Congress, on the basis of empirical evidence, resolves judicial
disagreements as to the probative value of recurring facts in
establishing a particular crime. Moreover, there are other
justifications for the passage of this presumption. First, evidence
relevant to an element may be readily accessible to the defendant but
difficult for the prosecution to obtain without a great deal of effort.
Thus, one commentator has suggested that the person best able to
explain why he was in possession of something is the defendant
himself.8 1 Similarly, it might be argued that it is within the
defendant's power to produce an innocent explanation of why he was
on the premises of an illegal distilling operation and that it is
burdensome for the prosecution to seek evidence negating all possible
explanations. In these circumstances, enactment of a presumption on
which the government can rely to reach the jury may save valuable
prosecutorial and investigative resources. Second, enactment of this
presumption may aid in proof of elements that are difficult for the
prosecution to establish (e.g., state of mind and illegal importation of
narcotics and knowledge of the same). 2 In providing each type of aid
to the prosecution, however, Congress has a significant function only
when it gathers empirical evidence and acts on the basis of expertise."3
Title 18 United States Code, section 892 is suitable for this type of
action, although presently it is only a natural inference presumption.
The section provides that a prima facie case of extortionate extension of
credit is made out by proving that the loan was usurious and that when
it was extended the debtor reasonably believed that the creditor had the
reputation for using extortionate means to collect. The provision appears
to rest on empirical evidence and expert knowledge of the loansharking
industry. Its purpose is to aid the government in proving extortion,
which is ordinarily hard to prove unless the defendant makes an express
threat to use force. However, unless the probative value of the facts
81. Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287,
288 (1928).
82. Id.; Sandler, The Statutory Presumption in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, 57 J,
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 7, 8 (1966).
83. If a rational provision involves only an assessment of natural inferences, then it is
superfluous. Without codification, the prosecution would get to the jury on the clear chain of
circumstantial evidence. No commentator has, to my knowledge, explicitly recognized the
distinction between cases in which Congress acts on the basis of expertise and cases which
involve only opinion as to natural inferences.
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giving rise to the provision are explained to the jury, the enactment will
not have its intended effect.
Similarly, the presumption involved in Gainey should be classified
as an empirical data presumption. It was passed to aid the government,
which had been having difficulty in the enforcement of alcohol tax laws.
Since jurors are not likely to have knowledge of the clandestine method
of producing liquor illegally, an explanation of the probative value of
the presumption is necessary. The government is aided by the statute
because the explanation of why the accused was on the premises is in his
control.
The judicial rule that possession of recently stolen goods prima
facie establishes knowledge that the goods were stolen" seems to be a
situation that also falls into the empirical data presumption category.
Several states have legislation on this problem and have limited the
application of the principle by either the type of goods involved,85 the
class of people from whom the goods are received," or the class of
people who received the goods.87 In my opinion, development of a
reasonable rule depends on an empirical study of the illicit traffic in
stolen goods. Such a provision would aid the prosecution in proving
state of mind.
8
I would not classify the existing narcotics presumption"
as an
empirical data presumption. It provides that possession of a narcotic
drug is sufficient evidence to authorize conviction for the crimes of
receipt, sale, concealment, purchase, or facilitating the transportation,
sale, or concealment unless the .defendant makes an explanation satisfactory to the jury. Normally; this inference is explained to the jury.
This seems unwarranted as the inference is apparent, clear, and compelling. If the instruction exerts influence on the jury, as one assumes it
does, the provision makes possession the crime.
84. E.g., United States v. Anost, 356 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Minieri,
303 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1962). The inference flowing from recent possession is permissive and not

mandatory. Therefore, it has been held that a trial judge may not charge that recent possession
gives rise to a "presumption" because the word connotes an obligation to find guilty knowledge
once the basic fact of possession is established. Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.
1956); United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1948). It is also error to charge that the
defendant has the burden of explaining recent possession. United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d
310 (2d Cir. 1960).
85. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-621 (1956); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-2721
(1947).
86. CAL. PEN. CODE § 496 (applies only when the goods are received from one under 18).
87. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1308.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). The presumption also relates to the element of illegal importation and knowledge of the same. This will become obsolete if the jurisdictional portion of the
statute is redrafted. See text accompanying note 20 supra.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
V.

[VOL. 22

CONCLUSION

I have recommended legislative action based on a consideration
of all possible cases and all relevant distinctions. First, I put to one
side those circumstances in which there was no need for the enactment
of a presumption or the use of a presumption concept. This includes
situations where the burden of coming forward and/or persuasion is
allocated to the defendant and where conclusive presumptions are
used. Then, I concluded that the minimal evidential effect of a
presumption should be to establish a prima facie case. It was also
stated that Congress may not accord a basic fact more probative
value than it has by natural inference nor may it give a presumption a
greater effect than establishing a prima facie or sufficient case.
These are the cases that are left: (1) the basic facts establish a
prima facie case on the basis of natural and apparent inferences; and (2)
the basic facts establish a prima facie case on the basis of empirical
evidence not readily known by or available to the public. On the basis
of my analysis, two kinds of presumptions are necessary to cover the
above cases: a natural inference presumption and an empirical data
presumption. These were carefully tailored to their particular
categories and were carefully limited by what were the justifications
for their enactment.

